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ABSTRACT 
 
Brittany Lynn Griese: The 2015 Suspension of the Dublin Regulation: an investigation into 
possible causes 
(Under the direction of Dr. Liesbet Hooghe) 
 
In the summer of 2015 European countries faced a refugee crisis unlike any since World 
War II.  The European Union has rules and directives in place dictating which member state is 
responsible for processing asylum claims, the Dublin III Regulation. However, as the 2015 
refugee crisis reached a climax, Dublin III was placed under increasing strain, and in September 
2015 the Dublin rules were suspended. This paper investigates the possible reasons and causes 
that lead to the suspension. It weighs the relative importance of two lines of argumentation: the 
role public pressure on governments to stem the tide of immigrants, and the importance of 
administrative overload in processing the registration of millions of refugees. The paper outlines 
the Dublin Regulation, a quick overview of the refugee crisis, and then investigates the two 
possibilities: bureaucratic incapacity or public pressure, while conducting a paired comparison of 
Germany and Hungary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In mid to late 2015 it was hard to open a news source without seeing new reports on the 
ever-growing refugee crisis in Europe. The refugees were coming from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and other areas such as Northern Africa in search of an escape from the constant conflict in their 
home country. One of the main issues facing the European Union (EU) was how to handle the 
constant flow of refugees, which were mixing with the ever-constant flow of migrants. The 
Dublin Regulation is the EU directive, which dictates which EU member state is responsible for 
processing the asylum request of an asylum seeker: that being the “country of first entry”. In fact 
the crisis was reaching unprecedented levels, and countries that adhered to the Dublin Regulation 
began to struggle to cope with the shear numbers. Dobra (2015: 92) articulates this by noting 
that, “the Dublin Regulation, even by changes brought until 2015, was not taking into account a 
crisis of a magnitude as perceived later as being ‘the greatest crisis of refugees from the second 
World War’.”  
As a result of the growing pressure by the influx of refugees, the Dublin Regulation was 
suspended for a time in 2015. In my paper I aim to investigate the chief causes of the breakdown 
of the Dublin Regulation. Was the suspension of Dublin III in the fall of 2015 a result of public 
pressure from populations, or was it a collapse of the bureaucratic registration process? I will try 
to answer this question by first defining some major terminology pertaining to the crisis, next 
outlining the Dublin regulation and describing the migrant crisis, and finally examining the 
relative veracity of two possible causes for the suspension- public pressure, and administrative 
overload- through a pair comparison of Germany and Hungary.  
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Definitions  
During the process of my research for this paper, I have come across different definitions 
and terminology. In some cases the crisis in 2015 is regarded as the “migrant crisis”, while other 
sources use the term “refugee crisis”. This difference in terminology, and how it impacted the 
view of the crisis in 2015, is well characterized by Holmes and Castaneda (2016). They describe 
how “at times the phrase ‘migrant crisis’ subtly delegitimizes calls for protection, whereas the 
phrase ‘refugee crisis’ reinforces them” (Holmes and Castaneda 2016: 16).  The distinction is 
that “refugee” implies involuntary migration, whereas “migrant” implies voluntary migration 
(Holmes and Castaneda 2016: 16-17).  For the purpose of this paper, I have chosen to use the 
term “refugee crisis”, as I believe it best describes the situation.  
 
In that respect I use the EU definition of a refugee, which is adopted from the 1951 Geneva 
Convention definition:   
“a person who owning to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country.” (Untied Nations Refugee Agency 1951)  
 
In regards to the term “third-country national”, I use the definition given in the Dublin 
regulation: 
“any person who is not a citizen of the Union within the meaning of Article 20(1) TFEU 
and who is not a national of a State which participated in this regulation by virtue of an 
agreement with the European Union” (Reg. No 604/2013: article 2).  
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I also use the EU classification of asylum granting, as outlined on the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS) website:  
“Asylum is granted to people fleeing persecution or serious harm in their own country 
and therefore in need of international protection.” (European Commission CEAS 2017) 
 
The Dublin Regulation 
Phases 
The Dublin Regulation is the EU directive meant to determine which member state is 
responsible for processing the asylum application of third country nationals. The Dublin 
Regulation was first outlined at the European Community Convention in Dublin in 1990. The 
Dublin Convention took place amid the opening of the borders to visa free travel between 
Schengen member states. The agreement was meant as a clarification and replacement of 
Chapter VII of the Schengen Agreement, “Responsibilities for Processing Applications for 
Asylum”, which outlines the obligations of the member states and the rights of the asylum seeker 
(Hurwitz 1999: 647). The Dublin Convention is similar to Chapter VII, however, Dublin goes 
into further detail regarding the responsibilities of each member state for processing an asylum 
claim, and also differentiates the rights of different types of asylum seekers (e.g. minors, 
unaccompanied minors, etc.). Hurwitz (1997: 647) describes the original aim of the Dublin 
Convention as: to establish “a system determining the State responsible for examining the 
applications for asylum lodged in one of the member states of the European Community.” 
At the time of its original incarnation, it was set up to meet the criteria of the 1951 
Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees. The criteria, as outlined in the preamble of 
EU regulation No 604/2013, the Dublin Convention III, included “thus ensuring that nobody is 
sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining the principle of non-refoulement.” The Dublin 
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regulation is not a CEAS, but instead a “clear and workable method for determining the member 
state responsible for the examination of an asylum application” (Reg. No 604/2013).  One of the 
main aspects of the passing of the 1990 Dublin Convention relied on “States mutual confidence 
in their asylum procedures” (Hurwitz 1999: 648). Since Schengen opened the borders between 
the countries and allowed for visa free travel, if the States did not have mutual trust the others 
asylum procedures then the system would not function.  
The Dublin process has gone through three iterations: Dublin I in 1995, Dublin II in 
2003, and Dublin III in 2013. The first Dublin Convention was updated on 18 February 2003 
with the passing of regulation No. 343/2003 (Dublin II). Lenart (2012: 5) outlines the original 
aim of Dublin II as:  
“Designed to prevent two of the most undesirable phenomena in the area of refugee law- 
‘refugees in Orbit’ (refugees circling between member states or within one Member State 
neither being allowed to stay within it’s territory, nor being able to leave it) – and ‘Asylum 
Shopping’ (lodging an application in several member states or choosing the one having the 
most lenient policy or practice in this respect) – and to bring order to the process of 
examining asylum application in the EU.” 
 
Under Dublin II the “one-stop” procedure was meant to tighten the reign on “asylum shopping” a 
process in which an asylum seeker will lodge asylum applications in multiple member states in 
hopes to find a State with more lenient asylum policies or greater social benefits. The “one-stop” 
policy states that the first country of entry, first European Union country that the asylum seeker 
sets foot in, would be responsible for processing the asylum claim. For this procedure to work 
well, just as with the original Dublin Convention, all States must have faith and trust in the 
asylum procedures of all other member states. The member states must trust that the asylum 
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seekers will be treated with similar levels of respect and dignity, while also being given adequate 
housing and support.   
 One of the main complaints from member states was in regards to the increased burden 
“on Southern and Eastern European Countries” (Lenart 2012: 6). This burden was a consequence 
of being the usual “country of first entry”, which resulted in these border countries being 
responsible for handling a disproportionate number of asylum claims. Yet, while these border 
countries were seeing the bulk of the asylum seekers, there was still a problem with “asylum 
shopping”.  
The new Dublin II regulation received sharp criticism from the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) for being insensitive to asylum seekers’ preferences and circumstances and being too 
cumbersome. The ten criticisms include: 
“1) No equivalence of protections throughout the Union leading to the ‘Asylum Lottery’ 
phenomena; 2) No possibility to choose the country of Asylum; 3) Dublin II Regulation as a 
responsibility- shifting instrument; 4) Responsibility for asylum application as a penalty for 
allowing their country nationals to enter the territory of ‘fortress Europe”; 5) length and 
cost of procedures and transfers; 6) No suspensive effect of appeal or judicial review 
against the decision to take charge or take back; 7) Possibility of detention; 8) Very limited 
notion of a ‘Family Member’; 9) Discretions of Member States with regard to application of 
sovereignty and humanitarian clauses; 10) Risk of violation of non-refoulement principle in 
case of automatic reliance on the provisions of the regulation” (quoted from Lenart 2012: 
12).  
 
Dublin III 
Dublin III came into effect in June 2013, and sought to respond to some of these concerns 
as well as to prepare for the accession of the new member states from Central and Eastern 
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Europe into the Schengen area. The official objective of Dublin III was to create “a common 
policy on asylum, including a Common Europeans Asylum System (CEAS), is a constituent part 
of the European Union’s objective of progressively establishing an area of freedom, security, and 
justice open to those who, forced by circumstances, legitimately seek protection in the Union” 
(Reg. No 604/2013: 31). The chief features of the current Dublin regulation are described below.  
 
Determining Responsibility  
Chapter Two, article three indicates the type of national who can apply for asylum; “member 
states shall examine any application for international protection by a third country national or a 
stateless person who applies on the territory of any one of them, including at the border or in the 
transit zones”(Res. No 604/2013: 37). The article goes on to explain that only one State may 
process the asylum application at any one time, and that State must be the “State of first entry” 
(Res. No 604/2013: 37). The “State of first entry” clause commands that the State responsible for 
processing the asylum application is the first State in which the applicant has set foot within. The 
next chapter discusses the criteria for determining which member state is ultimately responsible.  
Chapter three outlines the “Criteria for Determining the Member State Responsible”. The 
provisions include:  
• the procedure for minors [article 8 and article 6],  
• which State is responsible when the applicant has a legal residence permit [article 12],  
• the procedure for determining which member State is responsible depending on the 
“entry and stay” habits of the applicant [article 13], 
• what to do, when there are, “family members who are beneficiaries of international 
protection” [article 9],  
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• and the “discretionary clause” [article 17] (Res. No. 604/2013: 40).  
In terms of article 8, the member state responsible for handling the application of an 
unaccompanied minor is the State where there “is a family member or a sibling of the 
unaccompanied minor legally present, provided that it is in the best interest of the minor” (Res. 
No. 604/2013: 39). Then in article 6, “guarantee for minors”, it is outlined that the application 
process should be carried out in a manner, which has “the best interests of the child as the 
primary consideration” (Res. No. 604/2013: 38). In that regard, it is required that a representative 
of the unaccompanied minor is present at all times, and for that this representative is to “have the 
qualifications and expertise to ensure that the best interests of the minor are taken into 
consideration during the procedures carried out under this regulation” (Res. No. 604/2013: 38). 
Article 6 stresses the importance of finding family members of the unaccompanied minor, and to 
meet this end all member states should cooperate to identify possible family members. On a 
similar note, article 9 provides that the applicant may have his/her claim processed by the State 
in which they have family members present who “are beneficiaries of international protection”, 
but only “provided that the persons concerned [applicant] expressed their desire in writing” (Res. 
No. 604/2013: 39).  
 In terms of article 12, if the asylum applicant has a legal residency permit or visa from a 
member state, the issuing member state is responsible for processing the claim (Res. No. 
604/2013: 40). This means that even if an asylum seeker leaves the State in which he/she has a 
legal residency permit, and applies for asylum in a different State, the case will likely be sent 
back to that State. This article is meant as another remedy to curtail “asylum shopping” and to 
make sure the application is only processed in one country.  
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However, while these articles work together as a way to determine the responsible 
member state, article 17 brings the decision back to the discretion of the member state. Article 17 
states that a member state can decide to “examine an application for international protection” 
even if they are not determined to be the member state responsible, but in doing so they must 
notify all other member states using the “DubliNet electronic communication network set up 
under article 18 of the Regulation (EC) No. 1560/2003” (Res. No. 604/2013: 41). Member states, 
according to article 17, also are given the discretion “before a first decision is made they can 
request that another Member State takes over the request per family reunification humanitarian 
grounds” (Res. No. 604/2013: 41).  
 
Responsibility of Communication 
Article 4 outlines the “Right to Information” for the asylum seeker. All of this information is to 
be provided to the asylum seeker in a leaflet, which includes a specific leaflet for unaccompanied 
minors. This article states the information should be presented to the applicant “as soon as an 
application is lodged” (Res. No 604/2013: 37). The information should include:  
• a description of the “consequences of making another application in a different member 
state”;  
• description of the “criteria for determining the member state responsible”;  
• information regarding a personal interview which is “pursuant to Article 5”; 
• the possibility of submitting information regarding the presence of family members, 
relatives or any other family relations in the Member State, including the means by which 
the applicant can submit such information” (Res. No. 604/2013: 37).  
Other communication to be presented to the applicant includes:  
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• information about “the possibility to challenge a transfer decision and where applicable, 
to apply for a suspension of the transfer”;  
• they are also to be provided information that member states “can exchange data on him or 
her for the sole purpose of implementing their obligations arising under this regulation”;  
• and finally the applicant is to be provided “the right of access to data relating to him and 
her and the right to request that such data be corrected if inaccurate or be deleted if 
unlawfully processed” (Res. No. 604/2013: 37).  
 
Interview 
Also stated in Chapter Two, article 5 is the responsibility of the State to conduct a personal 
interview which “shall be conducted in a language that the applicant understands or is reasonably 
supposed to understand, and in which he or she is able to communicate” (Res. No 604/2013: 38). 
This interview is used to gather information from the asylum seeker in regards to processing 
their application, and determine which State is responsible for processing their asylum 
application.  
 
Take Charge and Take Back 
Chapter Four outlines the “take charge” and “take back” procedures. Section III discusses 
the stipulations for issuing a “take back request”, which is when a member state requests another, 
which had been determined to be the State of first entry,  “take back” the asylum applicant. In 
terms of a “take charge” request this can be made by a member state after there is reasonable 
suspicion that an applicant has entered a different member state previously (Res. No. 604/2013: 
43). That means that once a person’s information has been flagged in the Eurodac system as 
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having been processed in different member state, the member state in which the applicant 
currently resides can request the original State to “take back” or “take charge” of the applicants’ 
request for asylum. This is meant as a way to prohibit “asylum shopping”, where an asylum 
seeker moves around to other member states in hopes of applying for asylum in a State with 
more lenient policies.  
This information may be received through a personal interview with the applicant or 
through the Eurodac system. Eurodac is an electronic information system first implemented in 
2000 as a shared information system that all member states use to log in the fingerprint and other 
biometric data of the applicant once they have applied in that State (Brekke and Brochmann 
2014). The applicant is to be fingerprinted (if over 14) and processed in the system as a way of 
keeping track of who has already applied for asylum in any member state (European Council 
regulation (EC) 2725/2000). If the asylum seeker’s information is flagged in the system, for 
example, because he has already applied for asylum, the member state has “two months after the 
Eurodac hit to send a take back request” (Res. No. 604/2013: 43). In regards to “take charge”, 
article 21 notes that a member state has “three months to request a ‘take charge’ from another 
member state” (Res. No. 604/2013: 43). Once a “take charge” request has been made the 
respondent State has two months to respond (Res. No. 604/2013: 43). 
When there is a change in member state responsibility, the applicant shall be informed in 
writing (Res. No. 604/2013: 43). In Section IV both articles 26 and 27 discuss the “procedural 
safeguards” for the applicant. Article 26 outlines how an applicant is to be informed of a transfer 
decision, and article 27 explains their rights to an appeal of the decision (Res. No. 604/2013: 46). 
In both situations the applicant has the right to free legal council if necessary, and that all 
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information must be shared with the applicant “in a language hat the person concerned 
understands or is reasonably supposed to understand” (Res. No. 604/2013: 45).  
 
Detention 
 The reasons and time limits for detention are outlined in Section V, article 28. While an 
applicant may be placed in detention, Dublin III stipulates:  
• “Member states shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he or she is 
subject to the procedure established by this regulation”,  
• that the person is only to be detained “when there is serious risk of absconding”,  
•  that “detention shall be for as short of a period as possible” (Res. No. 604/2013: 46).  
When a person is detained, and a “take charge” request has been made, the article dictates that 
the “take back” or “take charge” request must be responded to in one month. Once the response 
has been given and a transfer is decided the transfer “must take place no later than six weeks 
after responsibility claimed” (Res. No. 604/2013: 46). If the applicant is not in detention the 
transfer must take place within six months. The cost of that transfer is paid by the receiving 
member state-- not the asylum applicant (Res. No. 604/2013: 47).  
 
Crisis Management  
The article most relevant to the 2015 refugee crisis is article 33, “a mechanism for early 
warning, preparedness, and crisis management”. This article dictates that in times when it 
becomes evident that a State might not be able to handle the flow of asylum claims, the European 
Commission “shall, in cooperation with the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), make 
recommendations to the member state in crisis, inviting it to draw up a preventative plan” (Res. 
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No. 604/2013: 48). However, a member state does not have to wait for the Commission to 
request they draw up a preventative action plan, but can draw one up themselves and then 
present it to the Commission for review (Res. No. 604/2013: 49).   
The action plan must maintain the “asylum acquis of the Union,” that is to say that the 
action plan must not disrupt the asylum procedure of other member states and must maintain 
“fundamental rights of applicants for international protection” (Res. No. 604/2013: 49). This 
action plan can be implemented at the first sign of a crisis, and after the first implementation the 
member state must report to the European Commission every three months.  
 
The Refugee Crisis 
The refugee crisis of 2015 was the climax of a series of events and trends that began well 
before 2015. As Ostrand (2014: 259) notes, the EU has seen a mass influx of persons since 2001, 
but the levels rose dramatically after the Arab Spring of 2010-11 and reaches the highest levels 
so far in 2015. According to a BBC source (2016), “the conflict in Syria continues to be by far 
the biggest driver of migration. But the ongoing violence in Afghanistan and Iraq, abuses in 
Eritrea, as well as poverty in Kosovo, are also leading people to look for new lives elsewhere.”  
The refugee crisis of 2015 was thus not simply a result of European countries being 
unprepared for processing asylum applications, but appears tied to the rapid rise in the number of 
asylum applicants during 2015. In Connor’s words (2016: 6), “Since 1985, Europe received 
about 11.6 million asylum applications- meaning that last years 1.3 million amounted to about 
one tenth of all applications received during the past 30 years by current EU countries, Norway, 
and Switzerland.” The systems began to become bogged down with applications, and there was 
also the issue of how to provide housing and support to a growing number of people. 
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Routes of Arrival 
Refugees were arriving to the EU by diverse means. The routes to Europe are not new, 
but they were being used by an increasing number of people. Refugees and migrants were 
mingling together on the route to Europe and caught up in an increasingly perilous journey as 
borders begin to close to them. The European Commission published a communication on March 
2, 2016, in which it described the crisis as follows: “Today more than 60 million people have 
been displaced as a result of war, protracted conflict, or severe national disasters. Between Jan 
2015 and February 2016, over 1.1 million people – refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants, have 
made their way to the European Union, either escaping conflict in their countries of origin or in 
search of a better and safer life” (quoted in Dobra 2016: 96).  
 
There were three main routes for asylum seekers to get to Europe:  
a. Across the Mediterranean from North Africa to Italy or Spain 
b. Across the eastern land route from Turkey via Bulgaria 
c. Across the western Balkans from Greece via Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary 
 
The most perilous is across the Mediterranean. It is here that people are often clustered on small 
boats, most not even sea worthy vessels, and set sail in the cover of darkness with hopes of 
reaching the shores of a European country by the morning. Many die in the water before help 
arrives. Italy has been dealing with the refugees and economic migrants coming from Northern 
Africa across the Mediterranean since before the height of the Arab Spring violence in 2011. The 
Italian navy has been employed in the EU operation Mare Nostrum since the spring of 2013 to 
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rescue the third country nationals from the sea. Since 2014, the action has been taken over by the 
European Union’s Frontex naval border patrol.  
 Along with those coming by sea from Northern Africa, are those taking the western 
Balkans route. As time went on, the borders between the non-EU Balkan countries and Hungary 
became increasingly militarized. Kallius, Monterescu, and Rajaron (2016: 26) note, “Hungary 
occupies a strategic corridor between Serbia and Austria; in recent years, it has developed into a 
crucial entry point to the EU Schengen area.” With an increase in traffic, and people passing 
through irregular border crossing points as a way to evade having to make their Asylum claim in 
Hungary instead of a more desirable country (i.e. Germany or Sweden), the Hungarian 
government took a drastic choice and began to erect a razor wire border wall. The crisis in 2015 
played out on television screens, in published photos from news sources throughout the world, 
and in the daily lives of many Europeans. 
 
Overview of Numbers 
As the crisis began to climax the sheer number of refugees began to increase, which 
caused a major stress on the system. A Eurostat report from March 2016 estimated that over 1.2 
million first time asylum applications had been submitted from January 2015 until December 
2015 (Eurostat 2016). While in 2016, a different Eurostat report, showed the number of first time 
applicants, only decreased by around 50,000 applications, still leaving the number of first time 
applicants at around 1.2 million (Eurostat 2017). In comparison, Eurostat (2016) estimated that 
in 2014 there were only around 563,000 first time applicants. The report published on March 4, 
2016, included the below chart outlining the drastic increase in first time asylum applications 
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comparing 2014 to 2015. Some of the most drastic increases are shown in Hungary, Belgium, 
Germany, Austria, Finland, and Sweden.  
 
TABLE 1: “First time asylum applicants in the EU member states” (EuroStat 2016) 
  Number of first time applicants  Share in EU 
total (%)  
Number of 
applicants per 
million 
inhabitants*  
2014 2015 Change 
(in %) 
2015/ 
2014  
2015 2015 
EU  562 680  1 255 640  123% 100.00% 2 470  
Belgium  14 045  38 990  178% 3.10% 3 463  
Bulgaria  10 805  20 165  87% 1.60% 2 800  
Czech Republic  905 1 235  36% 0.10% 117 
Denmark  14 535  20 825  43% 1.70% 3 679  
Germany  172 945  441 800  155% 35.20% 5 441  
Estonia  145 225 54% 0.00% 172 
Ireland  1 440  3 270  127% 0.30% 707 
Greece  7 585  11 370  50% 0.90% 1 047  
Spain  5 460  14 600  167% 1.20% 314 
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France  58 845  70 570  20% 5.60% 1 063  
Croatia  380 140 -63% 0.00% 34 
Italy  63 655  83 245  31% 6.60% 1 369  
Cyprus  1 480  2 105  42% 0.20% 2 486  
Latvia  365 330 -10% 0.00% 165 
Lithuania  385 275 -29% 0.00% 93 
Luxembourg  1 030  2 360  129% 0.20% 4 194  
Hungary  41 215  174 435  323% 13.90% 17 699  
Malta  1 275  1 695  33% 0.10% 3 948  
Netherlands  21 780  43 035  98% 3.40% 2 546  
Austria  25 675  85 505  233% 6.80% 9 970  
Poland 5 610  10 255  83% 0.80% 270 
Portugal  440 830 89% 0.10% 80 
Romania  1 500  1 225  -18% 0.10% 62 
Slovenia  355 260 -27% 0.00% 126 
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Slovakia  230 270 18% 0.00% 50 
Finland  3 490  32 150  822% 2.60% 5 876  
Sweden  74 980  156 110  108% 12.40% 16 016  
United Kingdom  32 120  38 370  19% 3.10% 591 
Norway  10 910  30 470  179% -  5 898  
Switzerland  21 940  38 060  73% -  4 620  
While some of the countries have seen minimal increases in first time asylum applicants, the 
drastic rise in numbers over a one-year period has regardless placed a strain on the system as a 
whole. Dublin lays down the rules for who is responsible for processing an asylum claim, and 
with numbers that, in some places, have seen an increase of over 100% determining exactly who 
is responsible according to Dublin becomes a much longer process.  
 
Two Possible Reasons for the Suspension 
Why has the Dublin regulation broken down resulting in the temporary suspension of 
transfers? I entertain two plausible lines of explanation: a bureaucratic capacity argument and/or 
a response to public pressure. The first line of argument looks for the reason of the breakdown in 
the severe and asymmetric bureaucratic burden of enforcing Dublin in the face of the sudden 
influx of refugees. The second argument is that some governments defected because of rising 
public pressure, which pushed them to act when vast numbers passed through borders. I will 
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examine these two arguments by first briefly investigating the situation in the EU as a whole and 
then through a comparative case study of Hungary and Germany.  
 
Bureaucratic (in)capacity 
Many scholars have noted bureaucratic impediments both at the EU and national level. 
First, several highlight the inability of Dublin to cope with a crisis of this magnitude. A report 
ordered by the European Commission (2015: 4) stated, “Dublin III was not designed to deal with 
situations of mass influx, which has severely reduced its relevance in the current context and has 
undermined achieving its objectives.” Hence, even before the refugee crisis in 2015, it seems that 
there have been cracks in the system, but those cracks were made into crevices as a result of 
2015.  
Moreover, the differences in asylum procedures in EU member states were known to 
negatively affect the processing of stopping “asylum shopping”. Brekke and Brochmann (2014: 
146), point to “national differences in reception conditions, access to integration measures and 
social rights undermine the supranational efforts to coordinated policies across the region”, and 
that “these differences encourage secondary movement by migrants, movement that the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) was intended to prevent.” The CEAS was “based on the 
principle that it should not matter which country you flee to”, as all should have the same 
standards (Brekke and Brochmann, 2014: 146). However, that was not the case as Dublin III 
returns had been suspended with respect to Greece in 2011, and Norway proposed to do the same 
with respect to Italy in 2012 (Brekke and Brochmann 2014: 148). The case of Greece even went 
to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2011, which confirmed the suspension of 
Dublin III returns to Greece. Brekke and Brochmann (2014: 148) note two of the main 
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challenges of implementing and enforcing Dublin III include there being a “disproportional 
burden on the countries on Europe’s Southern border” and the “differences in reception 
conditions, processing ability, and access to social rights prompt regime competition.” In the 
European Commission’s report, the “Evaluation of Dublin III Regulation”, it is also clarified 
how “Dublin III was not designed to ensure fair sharing of responsibility and does not effectively 
address the disproportionate distribution of applications for international protection” (EU 
Commission 2015: 4).  
 
Public pressure 
An alternative explanation resides in public opinion, which rapidly became more critical 
of immigrants across Europe. This is apparent from the Pew Research Center Spring 2016 
Global Attitudes Survey of the Pew Center, conducted in ten European countries: Hungary, 
Poland, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Greece, UK, France, and Spain. Wike, Strokes, 
and Simmons (2016: 3) discussed how the main concerns for many Europeans were the “security 
and economic repercussion of the refugee crisis”. Wike, Strokes, and Simmons (2016: 3) asked 
the respondents to rate the three responses in order of that which they believe is the most 
worrisome issue facing their country. The three responses were: 1) “refugees will increase the 
likelihood of terrorism in our country”, 2) “Refugees are a burden on our country because they 
take our jobs and social benefits”, and 3) “refugees in our country are more to blame for crime 
than other groups”.  
 
TABLE 2: Views Towards Impact of Refugees 
Country	 R1	 R2	 R3	
Hungary	 76%	 82%	 43%	
Poland	 71%	 75%	 26%	
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Netherlands	 61%	 44%	 N/A	
Germany	 61%	 31%	 35%	
Italy	 60%	 65%	 47%	
Sweden	 57%	 32%	 46%	
Greece	 55%	 72%	 30%	
UK	 52%	 46%	 28%	
France	 46%	 53%	 24%	
Spain	 40%	 40%	 13%	
Median	 59%	 50%	 30%	
The numbers in red refer to the most worrisome to the highest number of people in that country. 
Wike, Strokes, and Simmons (2016: 4) also surveyed the same group in regards to their views 
towards “Muslims in our country”, and found there was a majority with a unfavorable view:  
 
TABLE 3: Views on “Muslims in Our Country” 
Country	 Unfavorable	
Hungary	 72%	
Italy	 69%	
Poland	 66%	
Greece	 65%	
Spain	 50%	
Netherlands	 35%	
Sweden	 35%	
Germany	 29%	
 
However, the authors note that “for some Europeans negative attitudes towards Muslims are tied 
to a belief that Muslims do not wish to participate in the broader society” (Wike, Strokes, and 
Simmons 2016: 5). They conclude that, “the refugee crisis has brought into sharp relief deep 
ideological divides over views of minorities and diversity” (Wike, Strokes, and Simmons 2016: 
5).  
Another side of the public pressure argument is tied to the public perception of how the 
authorities are handling the situation. Examining public opinion in ten EU during the height of 
the crisis, Connor (2016: 7) concludes “disapproval was generally greatest in countries with the 
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highest number of asylum seekers in 2015.” It is interesting that the EU appears to bear most of 
the blame. When asking citizens from the ten EU countries the question “Do you (Disapprove/ 
Approve) of the way the European Union is dealing with the refugee crisis?” a majority in each 
country disapproved, with the some of the highest levels of disapproval in frontier countries 
(Connor 2016: 7). 
 
TABLE 4: Attitudes Towards EU Handling of Crisis 
Country	 Disapprove	 Approve	
Greece	 94%	 5%	
Sweden	 88%	 10%	
Italy	 77%	 17%	
Spain	 75%	 21%	
Hungary	 72%	 24%	
Poland	 71%	 19%	
UK	 70%	 22%	
France	 70%	 26%	
Germany	 67%	 26%	
Netherland	 63%	 31%	
 
That is not to say that all public opinion of refugees and migrants was negative. It is important to 
also note the work of humanitarian organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations, which 
were established as a way to meet the needs of the refugees and migrants that could not be met 
by the different governments. In actuality, European societies became more divided, both 
externally and internally, on how best to deal with the refugees. 
 
Case Studies 
Lets us now take a deeper look into the situation by focusing on two countries: Germany 
and Hungary. I have decided to use Germany and Hungary as my case studies for two reasons.  
The first is that while both are EU countries, Hungary occupies a part of the external border of 
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the EU, and has become a “country of first entry” and transit for those traveling along the 
Balkans land route. Germany on the other hand in landlocked in terms of Dublin. Germany, on 
the other hand, is landlocked in terms of Dublin, and has become a major “destination country”. 
The second reason is the difference in the initial government response and subsequent responses.   
I will apply the same criteria for determining possible reasons for the suspension of 
Dublin III in both countries.  
 
Hungary 
Overview of crisis  
 In May 2015 there were around 2,500 asylum seekers and migrants entering Hungary per 
week (Piazza 2016, Part I: 40).  Police reportedly gave them temporary stay permits and 
approximate directions to refugee camps further inland (Piazza 2016, Part I: 40). The situation on 
the ground was a lot more disorganized. Piazza (2016, Part I: 40) describes how “in reality, there 
is a chaotic flow of people through the country, mostly bypassing the refugee camps and 
slipping, or being smuggled, into Austria.” By June, the estimates of asylum seekers and 
migrants entering Hungary weekly increased to around 4,000, and this upsurge had police and 
border personnel struggling to process all the asylum claims (Piazza 2016, Part I: 40). It is at this 
time that more NGO’s and humanitarian groups began to increase their assistance to the growing 
number of asylum seekers and migrants arriving in Hungary each day.  
On June 17, 2015, the Hungarian government decided to build a border wall along the 
border with Serbia in hopes of stopping the irregular border crossings which made it hard to 
process all those arriving through the proper Dublin channels (Piazza 2016, Part I: 40). However, 
as Piazza (2016, Part I: 40) goes on to explain the number of asylum seekers and migrants 
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entering Hungary steadily grew to reach in July to around 7,000 a week, and in August the 
numbers reached around 12,000 per week. By September 1, 2015, the Hungarian government 
stopped all trains from leaving for Austria, and the asylum seekers who did not want to register 
in Hungary were left stranded in the train station (Piazza 2016, Part I: 42).  In response to this 
move by the Hungarian government, the asylum seekers decided to march along the M1 highway 
between Budapest and the Austrian border, a move that became known as “The March of Hope”. 
The March of Hope took place on September 4, 2015, with over 4,000 asylum seekers taking 
part (Piazza 2016, Part I: 42). After Austria agreed to let the refugees’ pass through its border, 
the Hungarian government sent buses to pick up the people from the M1 highway and drive them 
across the border into Austria (Piazza 2016, Part I: 42). The border wall with Serbia was 
completed on September 15, 2015 and a subsequent border with Croatia was completed on 
October 16, 2015 (Piazza 2016, Part I: 44).  
 
Number of Refugees 
 At the height of the crisis in August, almost 12,000 people per week were passing 
through Hungary (Piazza 2016). It has been estimated by both Connor (2016: 5) and the EU 
EuroStat Report (2016), in 2015 there were 174,000 asylum applications made in Hungary.  
 
Government Response 
 The response by the Hungarian government to the increasing flow of refugees and 
migrants was by and large skeptic. On April 24, 2015, the FIDESZ government of Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán sent out the “National Consultation Regarding Immigration and Terrorism 
to eight million voters in Hungary” (Piazza 2016, Part II: 33). This questionnaire, as described by 
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Piazza (2016, Part II: 33) in “Living our Values- Part II”, included twelve questions which 
wording that invited negative responses. One online Hungarian publication, the Orange Files, 
published the questionnaire along with the original letter of introduction, translated to English, 
on their website. To quote one part of the letter, as translated by the Orange Files (2016), “Since 
Brussels has failed in the handling of immigration, Hungary must take its own path. We will not 
permit subsistence immigrants to threaten the workplaces and subsistence of Hungarian people.” 
In the letter Orbán goes on to say, “We must decide how to defend Hungary against illegal 
border-crossings. We must decide how to limit explosively increasing subsistence immigration” 
(Orange Files 2016). The responses to the National Consultation were then used as justification 
for any response Hungary would take to limit the flow of refugees through the border.  
In conjunction with the National Consultation, the Hungarian government also began a 
poster campaign. The three posters included the phrases: “If you come to Hungary, you must 
respect our Culture”, “If you come to Hungary, you must respect our laws”, and “If you come to 
Hungary, you must not take away Hungarian jobs” (Piazza 2016, Part II: 34). Given that all three 
posters were solely in Hungarian, it seems that the intent was not to share these “Hungarian 
values” with the refugees.  
 Even though the Hungarian government seemed to oppose entry of more refugees, 
Hungary continued to adhere to the Dublin procedure and “insisted on registering all asylum-
seekers, mostly against their will” (Piazza 2016, Part II: 35). In fact, this process of registering 
all refugees continued “until the end of August when the numbers became totally unmanageable 
and it was clear that its EU partners were not holding Hungary to its obligations” (Piazza 2016, 
Part II: 35). The Hungarian government worked to maintain the Dublin Convention even after 
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the numbers had reached critical levels, and even with the reception centers dangerously over 
crowded.  
 
Public Response 
Apart from the responses to the National Consultation questionnaire, there were mixed 
responses from the public in Hungary. There were those who agreed with the government about 
the dangers of allowing refugees to enter the State, but there were also grassroots aid 
organizations and other non-governmental and humanitarian organizations which began to assist 
the asylum seekers who had already entered. One of the newly formed grassroots organizations 
was the Migrant Solidarity Group of Hungary (MIGSZOL), which saw itself as “an informed, 
unregistered political grassroots organization” (Migszol 2016). This group published their own 
report titled “Hungary’s Long Summer of Migration”, which was a combination of statistical 
information, and a recording of fifty personal interviews with current asylum seekers in 
Hungary.  
This group was opposed to the Dublin procedures, as they saw it as unfair, and expressed 
the view that “people seeking international protection are not merely numbers, the aggregate of 
flow, or monolithic entities”, and should not be treated as such (Migszol 2016). The group also 
criticized the Hungarian government for having “received millions of euro in support from the 
EU, but it has by and large failed to fulfill its responsibility to process the asylum applications of 
people seeking international protection” (Migszol 2016: 16). The criticism of the Hungarian 
governments response was also shared by academics. For example, Greenhill (2016: 323) argued 
that the crisis was used by Orbán and others like him to appeal “to such audiences, to show that 
those arriving on Europe’s shores are not viewed as refugees in need of protection and assistance 
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but rather a liability to national security, societal stability and cultural identity- soldiers in 
Orbán’s ‘invading army’, if you will.” In the end while the humanitarian groups, NGO’s, UN 
Human Rights organizations, and even the EU itself criticized the growing anti-refugee 
sentiment in Hungary, the Hungarian government was framing its response as just acting in the 
best interest of securing the external European border.  
The upshot was a growing divide between governmental (vertical) and civil society 
(horizontal) political actions. Kallus, Monterescu, and Rajoron (2016: 27) define vertical 
political actions as those which “located agency and action necessarily and exhaustively on the 
side of the State and leave no room for agentive responses by Migrants,” and horizontal political 
action as “involving private citizens working with migrants, standing with them in their protests, 
sheltering people, and transporting them to the western border.”  Hence, Kallus, Monterescu, and 
Rajoron (2016: 27) attribute the breakdown of the Dublin regulation in part to “these 
solidarities,” which “in turn, highlighted slippages between humanitarian and political action and 
led to the de facto collapse of the Dublin regulation.”  
 
Germany 
Overview of Crisis  
Germany is no stranger to refugees, as the country had experience with German refugees 
following the Second World War and East German refugees during the Cold War. As a result, 
the policies towards refugees and asylum seekers have been more open than their Central and 
Eastern European neighbors. Germany, on the other hand, is surrounded by EU member states, 
which are party to Dublin III. This means that even if refugees were to cross the German border, 
by train or foot, Germany would not typically be required to process their application. Thus 
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while there were arrivals in Germany in 2015, there was a high likelihood of the asylum seekers 
being returned to the “country of first entry”.  The flow of refugees entering Germany tended to 
come from Hungary and Austria. During the height of the crisis, it was harder to distinguish from 
which country was the “first entry” country, as many seekers worked to circumvent the 
registration process. Also, the number of asylum seekers with open applications began to bog 
down the German asylum system. The result was a suspension of Dublin returns from Germany 
and a defacto suspension of the Dublin Regulation in all of the EU.    
 
Number of Refugees  
 The number of asylum applications lodged in Germany during the crisis varies depending 
on which source is used. That being said, one thing that most sources have in common is that 
they all make it known that Germany has had the highest number of applicants. Connor (2016: 
10) states that, “asylum applicants to Germany alone accounted for almost one-third of Europe’s 
2015 Asylum Seekers.” The more agreed upon number of first time applicants is listed at 
442,000, (Connor 2016; EuroStat 2016). However, there have been other reports, one from the 
Brookings Institute, which have the number of refugees in 2015 as being close to 1.1 million, 
with “Berlin received nearly 10,000 refugees in November alone” (Katz, Noring, and Garrelts 
2016: 2). This difference may be a result of the data collection processes of the different sources: 
first time applicants (Connor 2016; EuroStat 2016), compared to total number of applications 
(Katz, Noring, and Garrelts 2016).  
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Government Response 
The Government in Germany had a very different response to the Asylum seekers, than 
that of Hungary. Holmes and Castaneda (2016: 14) describe that, “while countries such as Israel 
and most of the Gulf States have uniformly turned away refugees, and others such as Hungary 
have answered with direct violence, Germany has responded with ambivalent hospitality that is 
uniquely nuanced and conditioned by memories (and some present day realities) of xenophobia 
and fascism.” However, even though Holmes and Castaneda (2016: 14) praise the responses of 
Germany, they are also quick to clarify “there is no unified Germany in response to the crisis.”   
Germany has had a process in place for admitting Syrian refugees since 2013. Ostrand 
(2015: 267) explained that in March 2013 “Germany announced the initiation of a program for 
admitting Syrian refugees, primarily from Lebanon.” In this program Germany “vowed to accept 
20,000 refugees” who were currently settled in Lebanon, for resettlement in parts of Germany 
where there would be housing provided along with other governmental services of support 
(Ostrand 2015: 267). Syrians admitted through this program received a two-year temporary 
residence permit. Syrians obtained their visa in Lebanon before coming to Germany (Ostrand 
2015: 267). The situation in the spring and summer of 2015, which caused increasing strain on 
the Dublin system in Germany, was in regards to refugees entering Germany before obtaining a 
residency permit or visa. 
 The German government is often cited as being the first country to break with the Dublin 
regulation thus leading to its suspension. However, this is not true. The tweet from the German 
Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) posted on August 25, 2015, that had been 
rumored to trigger the collapse of Dublin was actually within the bounds of Dublin III. The 
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tweet, translated from German by The Guardian, read “the #Dublin procedure for Syrian citizens 
is at this point in time effectively no longer being adhered to” (Oltermann and Kingsley 2016).  
This is in line with article 17 of Dublin III, the discretion clause. Article 17 states that a 
country can decide to process the application of an asylum seeker even if that State is not the 
“country of first entry”, but in doing so they must notify all other countries through DubliNet. 
Thus article 17 gives any member state the right to take over an asylum application at their own 
discretion. Oltermann and Kingsley (2016) describe how the tweet was in connection to a memo 
sent to all BAMF offices in regards to asylum applications. The memo, “Rules for the suspension 
of the Dublin Convention for Syrian Citizens”, was sent by Angelika Wenzel a senior executive 
government official at BAMF. Oltermann and Kingsley (2016) summarize the memo as simply 
stating  “the Syrians who applied for asylum in Germany would no longer be sent back to the 
country where they had first stepped on European soil.” They also point out how this tweet was 
not meant “to torpedo the unloved law [Dublin III], but as an emergency de-cluttering measure, 
freeing the agency from additional bureaucracy before it was unable to cope” (Oltermann and 
Kingsley 2016).   
There was criticism of the move by BAMF to send out the tweet, noting that even the 
Interior Ministry was unaware of the context of the tweet. Thomas, Bradley, and Geiger (2015), 
note that the Interior Minister did not approve the tweet before it was sent out, but “it didn’t even 
require approval from the Interior Ministry and was aimed only at BAMF’s 36 field bureaus 
around the country.” They went on to explain that “the Interior Ministry said that the agency had 
full authority to issue the guideline and that its reasons were both humanitarian and practical: it 
took too much paperwork to send the refugees back to the first EU country where they set foot” 
(Thomas, Bradley, and Geiger 2015). The Dublin regulation required that a “take back” or “take 
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charge” could take as long at two months to reach a decision, which was impractical in the case 
of the mass influx of refugees crossing the border each day. In this context, the German 
authorities choice to apply article 17 to Syrian refugees was within their authority. However, this 
decision had lasting impacts in not only Germany, but the surrounding countries as well.  
 The initial response from German Chancellor Angela Merkel was to welcome to the 
refugees. Smale (2016) explains how the Chancellor’s own past of growing up in East Germany 
had impacted her view on accepting refugees. Smale (2016) also described how the Chancellor 
coined the phrase “‘Wir schaffen das’ (roughly ‘We can make it’)” in response to growing 
discontent over the number of refugees arriving in Germany.  
 
Public Response 
The public response has been disparate. According to Holmes and Castaneda (2016: 15) 
it was tied to the idea of who is “deserving of Asylum”. It seems that, as Holmes and Castaneda 
(2016: 15) describe, “in general, Syrian families are seen as deserving because they are 
understood to have been forced to flee by the ongoing civil war.”  
However, public opinion was ever changing during the crisis. Portions of the population 
embraced refugees at train stations with open arms and posters expressing their “Welcome”, but 
there were also instances of vandalism and arson of refugee housing centers. Lawler (2015) 
described “Unruly protests and incidents of arson incited by anger over the influx of migrants 
have plagued German cities in recent weeks. Mrs. Merkel has herself been subjected to jeers 
from anti-immigrant protesters, whom she has called ‘disgusting’.”  The Economist published an 
article just a little over a month after the tweet, which discussed the ever-changing opinion of the 
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public. It outlined how “in a survey by German public television 51% of Germans say that they 
fear the refugee influx, 13 points more than in September” (The Economist 2015).   
The German cities struggled with how to house and take care of the ever-growing number 
of refugees. There were humanitarian organizations along with the German government and 
various NGOs, which have taken up the cause to find housing and provide support, but many 
cities struggled to find empty housing. The Economist (2015) described how “The government 
of Hamburg has begun seizing empty office buildings to house refugees, raising constitutional 
questions. Berlin and Bremen are considering similar measures.” Many cities within Germany 
became over burdened by the sudden increase. In fact, the situation eventually led to a turn in 
public opinion on both the refugees and the response by Chancellor Merkel.  
At the same time, support for the German far right Populist Party, Alternative for 
Germany (AfD), increased. Fischer (2016) described how AfD was able to “campaign on fears of 
refugees”. Schwartz (2016), also discussed how “over the past two years, as Merkel has 
welcomed Muslim refugees and led the bailout of struggling European economies such as 
Greece, populist sentiments have surged- and the AfD is now reaping the rewards.” In fact in the 
recent State elections held in Mecklenburg- Western Pomerania, AfD was able to obtain more 
votes than the Christian Democratic Union, of which Merkel is a member (Schwartz 2016).  
 
Comparison and Conclusion 
The refugee crisis of 2015 exposed the flaws and faults of the Dublin Regulation, and the 
variances in the asylum policies of each member state. While all iterations of the Dublin 
Regulation aimed to limit “asylum shopping”, the asylum seekers still ‘shopped around’. The 
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Dublin regulation had no real mechanisms in place to deal with mass influx of asylum seekers. 
The system was designed for a much smaller number of asylum seekers.  
The Dublin process only applies to help determine who is responsible for processing a 
claim, and figuring out responsibility can take time. The resources needed in each country to 
process asylum claims and determine responsibility accumulated as the number of asylum 
seekers increased. Even with crisis mechanisms in place, such as Article 33 of Dublin III, the 
member states struggled to cope with the ever-growing number of asylum seekers. Through my 
own research, I had not found any instance of Article 33 being used by a member state during 
this crisis, and I did not expect to find one as Article 33 implies foresight into the possibility of a 
crisis. The only European Commission communiqué was related to Greece, which instructed the 
country to reinstate the Dublin procedure after the 2011 European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) suspension of Dublin returns to Greece.  
While the key question was if the suspension of Dublin III was a result of public pressure 
or a breakdown of the bureaucratic registration process, it seems that the situation was provoked 
by a combination. In terms of Germany, the suspension was actually a result of a bureaucratic 
decision to implement Article 17, and an illustration of a breakdown in the bureaucratic process. 
BAMF noted the inability to keep up with the paper work as one reason why they issued the 
memo and the subsequent tweet. However, it seems that the tweet by BAMF became the 
lynchpin for a breakdown of Dublin processing in other countries. Once the decision by BAMF 
became public knowledge, it became impossible for Hungary and other member states to 
continue to stop refugees from traveling on to Germany.  
In terms of public pressure, it does seem that the suspension was a result of pressure from 
a different angle than that which I had originally hypothesized. Before I began my research I 
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believed that public pressure would come from possible public attitudes towards the flow of 
refugees and migrants.  The other angle, which emerged in my research, was the impact of 
pressure from the refugees themselves. While a large number of refugees had been registered in 
Hungary, they did not want to stay in Hungary. One example of this was the situation in 
Budapest’s’ Keleti train station, where trains had been stopped and there were refugees were 
camping in the halls. This was, in part, a result of refugees who were trying to evade registration 
in Hungary, so that when they finally reached their destination country they would not be 
returned to Hungary. Even those who had been registered still tried to continue their journeys on 
to Germany, Belgium, or even Sweden. Also, in the case of Hungary, there was public pressure 
from local humanitarian groups who believed that there was not enough being done for the 
refugees, which had an impact on the Hungarian response to the situation. However, in terms of 
housing in both Hungary and Germany, the issue was that there simply was not enough 
designated space to house the sheer number of refugees. In Hungary the designated camps did 
not have enough room to house the vast number of people, and in Germany some States decided 
to designate unused buildings as housing.  
In the end the Dublin Regulation was suspended temporarily because of increasingly 
unmanageable numbers of refugees, which caused stress to the bureaucratic processes and in 
turned swayed public opinion. All processes were interconnected. The reaction of the member 
states since the climax of the situation in September 2015 has been to remedy the situation and 
figure out the best way to ensure a Crisis of this magnitude does not impact the EU again.   
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